Introduction
When considering security systems, the image that often comes to mind is that of digitalu ser authentication devices, such as keypadl ocks or biometric scanners. These electronic devices,a lthough differenti nf unction and purpose, are based on digitalc omputations ystems, which, in turn, rely on the operation of electronic logic gates that process binary inputs (i.e., 0f or low and 1f or high) and produce binary outputs according to the rules of Boolean logic. Because digital security systems are essential for protecting information in modern life, for example, by securing communication (e.g.,c ryptography) or preventing access (e.g.,p assword protection) to ap articular location or to personal and financiald ata, there is ac onstant need to devise new encryption and authentication methods to ensure that private data are secure.
In recent years, an alternative, molecular approach, to securing information has emerged. Rathert han authorizing electronic or biometric signals with electronic circuits on solid support, the molecular approachr elies on molecular-based devices that can respondt os pecific input sequences (i.e.,c hemical or opticalp asswords) in solution. The idea of creating such systemsh as emerged from the field of molecular logic gates. [66] [67] [68] [69] [70] [71] [72] The latter constitute au nique class of molecular switchest hat, in response to specific combinations of physical, chemical, or biological signals, can generate a" decision" [73] (e.g.,1 :T rue, 0: False) accordingt ot he logic underlying digital circuits. [66] [67] [68] [69] [70] [71] [72] Following the inception of the first molecular logic gate by de Silva, [74] av arietyo fm olecular "decisionmaking" devices have been developed, demonstratingt he generality of this approach. [66] [67] [68] [69] [70] [71] [72] Password authorizations ystems, such as an ATMm achine, are essentially "decisionmaking" systems that decidew hich users to authorize, ands o it was only natural that the principles of molecular logic would be implemented in security applications.T he molecular scale and the structural diversities of molecular-based security systems offer severala dvantages in comparison to macroscopic digitals ecurity systems. Their minute size, for example, complicates their detection, which provides am eans to conceal them and consequently,s teganography can be used as an additional layer of protection. In addition, the various types of building blockst hat can be used to create such systemsa nd the range of signals that serve as inputs significantly complicate replicating and consequently,cracking molecular security devices.
In this minireview,w eo utline the developments in the relatively young area of user authorization by molecular keypad locks. By focusing on several representative molecular password systems, we aim at highlightingt he versatility of such devicesa nd, more importantly,t he challenges that this interdisciplinary field faces. In the first part, we survey the development of molecular user authorizations ystems that operate accordingt ot he principles of electronic logic gates. This enables them to provide password protection, akin to digital electronic keypadl ocks. The second part focuseso na na lternative class of security systems that are based on pattern-generating molecular probes. The ability of such devices to generate distinct opticalf ingerprints enables them to afford several layers of security,b yh iding (steganography), encrypting( cryptography), and preventing access (password protection)t ot he information.
Molecular Logic Gate-Based User Authorization Systems

Password Protection
Password protection is considered as af ront line of defense against intruders because it is not used to hide or to encrypt Electronic user authorizations ystems help us maintain our privacy in many aspects of everyday life. However,t he increasing difficulty to secure accessa nd/or information digitally has inspired chemists to devise alternative, molecular approaches, in which users are identified by chemical means. The potential advantages of using molecular user authentication systems over conventionale lectronic devices are their versatility and unusualo perating principles, which complicate replicating and, consequently,b reaking into molecular security devices.
Their molecular scale is another unique propertyt hat enables hiding such systems and, consequently,a pplying steganography as an additional layer of protection.A lthough the area of molecular-based user authorizationi ss till in its infancy, the development of various molecular keypad locks and, more recently,apassword-protected molecular cryptographic machine, indicatet he possibility of protecting information at the molecular scale.
data. Instead, it prevents unauthorized users from accessing it. Systemst hat can authorize passwordsc an be set up to recognize au nique string of predetermined inputs. Only by entering the corrects tring can an output that unlocks the system be generated. One of the most common classes of such security systemsa re electronic keypadl ocks. These logic circuits generally consist of severali nterconnectedl ogic gates that can control, for example, the openingo fadoor or as afe. What distinguishes these locks from simple electronic logic circuits,w hich respondt os pecific input combinations,i st hat they can also determine the order by which the inputs are introduced (also referred to as ap assword), which provides them with the ability to grant access.B ecause the strength of ap assword increases with the password length, the level of security provided by keypadl ocks largely depends on the number of inputs and permutations that can be differentiated by such devices.
Molecular Keypad Locks
Am olecular device mimicking the functiono fakeypad lock ( Figure 1 ) was first created by Margulies and Shanzer. [1] This molecular security system demonstrated that, in addition to identifyings pecific combinations of inputs, molecular logic systems can be used to determine the order of input entry,w hich makes this technology suitable for password authorization. The molecular keypad lock 1 (Figure 1a )c omprises two fluorescent dyes, pyrene (Pyr) and fluorescein( Flu), which serve as af luorescence resonance energy transfer (FRET)d onor and acceptor pair,r espectively.T hese dyes are linked via at ri-hydroxamate linker that binds Fe III with high affinity and selectivity. The designated inputs for this system are an iron chelator (EDTA, input E), ab ase (sodium acetate, input B), and aU V beam (344 nm, input U)s uitable for exciting the Pyr probe. The outputs are recorded at two different emission channels: Flu emission (525 nm, green channel) or Pyr emission (390 nm, blue channel). Passwords that can "unlock" the system correspond to input sequences that can trigger the formation of ah igh emissioni nachosen channel. Figure 1a shows the fluorescencer esponses of the iron-bound system (state I) to the addition of inputs Ea nd Bu nder an excitation wavelength of 344 nm. Without inputs, Flu is in its fluorescent monoanionic form (state I), which leads to FRET between Pyr and Flu. However,b ecause the fluorescence of Flu is quenched by the bound ferric ion, this FRET process does not generate significant emission. Addition of E( I!II) leads to Fe III extraction and, at the same time, to protonation of Flu owing to the chelator's acidic nature. This generates an on-emissive Flu (neutral lactonic form, state II), which results in an intenseP yr fluorescence at 390 nm. The subsequent addition of Bt os tate II,( II! IV), leads to Flu deprotonation, affording as trongly emissive dianionicF lu (state IV).
The underlying principle that makes the system dependent on the order of the chemical inputs (EB vs. BE) is the slower kinetics of Fe III extraction under ab asic environment. After first adding Bt os tandbys tate I,( I !III), Flu is deprotonated and transformed into ah ighly fluorescent dianionic state, but it remains partially quenched by the bound ferric ion( state III). Addition of Et os tate III (III!IV) extracts the bound ferric ion; however,t his time iron extraction by Ei sm uch slower,o wing to the stronger affinity between Fe III and the tri-hydroxamate ligand under ab asic environment. By limiting the time interval between the introductiono fe ach input to af ew minutes, and by considering Ua sathird input, this kinetic differencem akes the systemr espond differently to sequences EBU (high output "1") and BEU (low output "0") in the green channel (Figure 1b) . This makesE BU the correct" password" for the green channel. All other input sequences (i.e., UBE, UEB, BUE, and EUB) do not give rise to strong fluorescencei nt his channel since this emission can only be generated when the UV excitation input (U) is introduced last. Similarly,o nly EU gives rise to strongf luorescence in the blue channel. The authorsp roposed that quenchers can be used as additional input keys (Figure 1c ,k eys A, C, D, F, G, H, I, #, and *), thereby elevating the security level of such ad evice. In this way,a nu nauthorized user that would enter one of these keys would automatically induce quenching of emission, which would result in authorization failure.
Since the emergence of the first molecular keypadl ock [1] ( Figure 1 ), varioust ypes of molecular security systemst hat can recognizep asswords via distinct mechanismsh aveb een developed, demonstrating the generality of this approach. One class of molecular locks is based on chromophoric or fluorescent molecular sensors that, similar to 1,r espondt o chemicali nput signals. An interesting system from this class was recently developed by Jiang and Ng,w ho showed that the design underlying 1,n amely,F luorophore1 -m etal ion binder-Fluorophore 2, can be extended to afford ak inetically controlled molecular keypad lock that can authorize af ourdigit password. [21] The molecular keypad lock 2 consists of ac oumarin dye that is covalently linked to rhodamine Bi ni ts closed, non-fluorescent, g-lactam form via am ultidentate metal binder (Figure 2 ). This system responds to four inputs, leads to the formation of a 2-Hg 2 + complex in whicht he emission of coumarin is quenched by the bound metal ion. The subsequenta ddition of 1equiv.o fC u 2 + results in the formation of ab inuclear 2-Hg 2 + -Cu 2 + complexi nw hich the g-lactam ring opens up. This results in enhanced rhodamine fluorescence. However, introducing first 1equiv.o fC u 2 + and only then 0.5 equiv.o fH g 2 + do not lead to enhanced rhodamine emission, which makes this system operate as am olecular keypadl ock. Presumably,w hen Cu 2 + is added first, it forms as trong 1:1c omplex with 2,w hich prevents furtherc oordination of Hg 2 + and the consequent opening of the rhodamine's ring. Expansion of the system to four inputs was carried out by introducing S 2À and an excitation beam as additional inputs. S 2À enhances the fluorescenceo fc oumarin;h owever,i tm ay also interactw ith the metal ions and alter the metal ion composition of the solution.T he system was shown to produce high fluorescencei nb oth channels only in response to the HCSL password out of the 24 possible input sequences.
Whereas systems1( Figure 1 ) and 2( Figure 2 ), and the various other kinetically controlled molecular keypad locks that respond to chemical inputs demonstrate well the generality of this approach, they also reveal af ew limitations of this technology. The difficulty of predicting the relative stabilityo ft he metastable species, for example, complicates rational design, whereas using an excitation beam as an additional input provides an inelegant meansofe nhancingp assword lengths without improving the efficiency of the molecular "processor".
The ability to create an entirely different family of molecular keypadl ocks, which utilize biological components, was first demonstrated by the group of Katz. [36] Since then, av arietyo f molecular and biomolecular password systems that respond to biological inputs, such as to enzymes, [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] proteins, [41, 42] and antibodies, [43] have been developed, demonstrating novel mechanisms for differentiating amongi nput sequences at the molecular level. An elegant bio-security system, 3,w hich combines an enzymatic cascade with ab iofuel electrochemical cell, [37] is described in Figure 3 . What provides this systemw ith the ability to recognize as pecific input sequence is that each enzymei nt he catalytic cascade produces the substrate for the next enzyme, until gluconic acidisproduced as afinal product. Ak inetically controlled molecular keypad lock (2)that can authorize af our-digit password.S equential addition of first Cu 2 + (input C) and then Hg 2 + (input H) prevents Hg 2 + from bindingto2 owingt oastronger interaction between Cu 2 + and 2.When the order of additioni sr eversed, however,Cu 2 + can binda long the already bound Hg 2 + .This leads to the opening of rhodamine's g-lactam ring and to high fluorescenceonly by entering the sequence HC. When two additional inputsa re used,S 2À (inputS ) and an excitationw avelengthof3 65 nm (inputL), 2 can selectively recognize the password HCSL.A dapted with permission from Ref. [21] .Copyright 2014 John Wiley &S ons.
The resultingdecrease in pH is detected by apH-sensitive electrochemical cell. In this cascade, b-amylase (bAm, Input A)h ydrolyzes starch into b-maltose. The latter is as ubstrate for maltose phosphorylase( MPh) and acid phosphatase (AP), which serve as input B.M Ph and AP convert b-maltose into glucose that, in turn, can be converted into gluconic acid by adding glucoseoxidase(GOx, input C). The ability of the system to operate as ak eypadl ock was demonstrated by sequentially adding the three enzyme inputs (A, B,a nd C)i nadifferent order to as olutionc ontaining the substrate (starch), ac o-substrate (phosphate), and K 3 [Fe(CN) 6 ], whichi sr equired for the output readings tage. After three successive input addition and filtration cycles, the filtrate is transferred to ac athode compartment of ab iofuel cell for the output readings tep (Figure 3) .
Only upon acidification of the cathodes olutionb yg luconic acid does the polymer-brush on the cathode become protonated and swell, allowing redox reactions to take place andp roduce an increased current only for the ABC sequence. In addition to the stated advantage of conjugating enzyme cascades to ab iofuel cell to make this system self-powered, this work demonstrates the possibility of bridging the gap between molecular and digital security systemsb ye ffectively turning biochemicalinputs into electrical signals.
Although the molecular keypad locks discussed above mimic the input sequence dependence found in digital keypad circuits,t hey lack some key features that are essential for developingp racticals ecurity systems. One such quality is the reset function, which enables au ser to bring the system back to its initial state. What complicates resetting molecular keypadl ocks that respond to chemical and biological inputs is the difficulty of removing the inputs from the solution following each computation cycle. Although it can be argued that single-use keypad locks are safer because any wrong guess would prevent them from ever being unlocked, such systems suffer from severe practical limitations. In particular, they require that an ew devicew ill be generatedp rior to each use and they may preventa ccess from al egitimate user who accidently enters aw rong key.
Ac lever way to circumvent the reset problem wasd emonstrated by AndrØasson and Gust, who developed an all-photonic molecular keypad lock (Figure 4) . [44] This systemb ypasses the disadvantages of using chemical inputs by processing and generating purely photonic signals. The chemical structure of the first all-photonic molecular password system [44] (Figure 4a ) consists of at etraarylporphyrin (P)u nit that bridges between the fulgimide (FG)a nd dithienylethene (DTE)p hotochromic switches. Using different irradiationw avelengths, each of the switchesc an undergo selective photoisomerization between the closed and open form (Figure 4a , FGc!FGo or DTEc! DTEo).A ss hown in Figure 4b ,t he open!close transition of both photochromic switches (FGo!FGc and DTEo!DTEc)i s triggered non-selectively by irradiating with UV light (366 nm, input U), whereas the transformation DTEc!DTEo occurs selectively under red light (l > 580 nm, input R). In addition, irradiationw ith green light (460 < l < 590 nm) convertsb oth DTEc and FGc backt ot heir open DTEo and FGo forms.B ased on these transitions, am olecular keypadl ockt hat responds to inputs R and U was developed. The output of this lock is the emission generated by tetraarylporphyrin (P)a t6 50 nm upon ac onstant excitation of the FGc unit at 470 nm. In the initial state (FGo-P-DTEo)b oth FG and DTE are in their open forms. In this state, the FGo does not undergo excitation at 470 nm and irradiation with red light (input R)d oes not inducea ny structuralc hange to the system. Irradiating at 366 nm (input U)c loses both the FG and DTE structures, which leads to the formation of the FGc-P-DTEc state. In this state, FGc undergoes excitation;h owever,t he emission energy is quickly transferred, first to P andt hen to DTEc,w hich is essentially non-fluorescent. Hence, by subjecting the initial state, first to R and then to U (sequence RU), only the non-fluorescent FGc-P-DTEc state can be formed. However,introducing R and U in areverse order (UR)l eads to the formationo ff irst, FGc-P-DTEc and subsequently, FGc-P-DTEo.I nt his state, the emission of FGc is transferred to P;h owever,t his time the emission of P is not quenched by the DTEo unit, which results in at urn-onf luorescence at 650 nm. The authors have also shown that by tog- gling each of the two inputs between an "off"a nd an "on" state, the all-photonic keypadl ock 4 can distinguish between the RU password and 8possible input combinations.
Af ew advantages of this optical molecular keypadl ock, such as its fast responses and the ability to bring it back to the initial FGo-P-DTEo state by irradiating it with green light (460 < l < 590 nm) have also been demonstrated, indicating the feasibility of generatingm olecular keypad locks that can be reset and used multiple times. Remarkably,A ndrØasson, Pischel, and Gust [45] have shown that all-photonic molecular logic devices can also perform variouso ther logic operations, in addition to password authorization. [45] The photonic reset functiono fp hotochromic security devices [44] [45] [46] [47] is also superior to that of other chemical logic systemsw ith reset capability,i n which the accumulation of chemical waste and dilution restrict the number of times the system can be recycled.
Despitet he significant advantages of resettingp hotonic molecular keypad locks (Figure 4) , al imitation of such systems, as well as the enzymatic (Figure 3 ) and chemical systems (Figures 1a nd 2) discussed before, is the difficulty of tuning them to recognize aw ide range of inputs. Ap ossible solution to this problem is using DNA-based molecular keypad locks, [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] [61] [62] in which the specific and reversible interaction between complementaryo ligonucleotides is used to obtain multi-input recognition. Another advantage of using DNA to scaffold molecular securitys ystemsi st hat it can be readily attached to solid support, which provides am eans to wash out the chemical inputs and make the systems reset. [48] The Wen group has used these features to obtain ah ierarchal DNA-based keypadl ock with as emi-automatic reset functiona nd naked eye detection [57] ( Figure 5 ). In the initial state, aD NA strand (I)i st etheredt o am agnetic bead (MB)t hrough biotin-streptavidin interactions. Three DNA input strands, A, B,a nd C,a re then sequentially added and the system is washed following each step. In this way,a ni nputs trand that cannotb ind the bead (i.e.,a ni ncorrect entry) is removed. Each DNA input contains ah airpin stem-loop structure with guanine-rich sequences ( Figure 5 , blue segments) at both termini. When input A is added, it binds specifically to strand I, owing to sequence complementarity.A saresult,t he hairpin structure of strand A opens up, revealing at oehold segment (markedi ny ellow) that can selectively interact with input B.A fter rinsing the system, the next input (B)i sa dded and binds to the surface-bound A.A s before,t he binding event opens up the hairpin structure of strand B,r evealing the next toehold (marked in purple) for binding C.I ntroducing input C to the solution affords an unstable I·A·B·C complex, which leads to the release of the A·B·C three-way-DNA-junction into the solution.T his last step is used to resett he system by recovering the magnetic bead-bound I (initial state) via magnetic separation, and it is also used to obtain an opticalo utput signal. Upon the formation of the A·B·C complex, the guanine-richs equences terminating each strand are broughti np roximity and form G-quadruplex-type structures that can interact with hemin to create aD NAzyme. The latter catalyzes the oxidation of TMB by H 2 O 2 to yield the chromogenic TMB + product. Because any oligonucleotide input that is not complementary to the toehold sequence introduced in the previouss tep is washed away,A BC is the only chemicalpassword that can trigger the colorreaction.
Another interesting example of aD NA-based molecular keypadl ock was demonstrated by Wang andc o-workers [53] ( Figure 6 ), who used hierarchal DNA recognition steps to authorizel ongerp asswords. In this system (Figure 6 ), as ixstrand-long linear DNA assembly was created by adding five input strands( a-e)t oastandby strand (s)i mmobilized on silver microspheres and rinsing the system after each input addition. Theo utput of this system is an enhanced absorption at 650 nm, which results from hemin-dependentc atalytic oxidation of TMB,a sd etailed before for system 5 ( Figure 5 ). This output could only be obtainedb ye ntering the five DNA input keys in the corrects equence: abcde.
Although the variousDNA-based molecular keypadl ocks developed so far [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] [61] [62] demonstrate well af ew advantages of using such systems, for example, the ability to authorize longerp asswords, as well as the ability to tunea nd reset Figure 5 . AD NA-based moleculark eypadlock (5). The 5' ends are denoted by squares, whereas toeholdsa nd their complementary sequencesa re indicated by the samecolor (red, yellow,and purple). The terminal guanine-rich sequencesa re markedinb lue. Addition of strand A to as tandby state I affords the I·A duplex and reveals atoehold that can bind the nextinput(B). This process is repeated with the sequentialaddition of strands B and C until the A·B·C three-way-DNA-junction is formed and dissociates from the bead, which enablest he systemt or eset. The dissociated A·B·C complex formsaDNAzyme uponthe binding ofh emin, which results in chromogenic oxidation of TMB. Because any input that is not complementary to the toehold sequence introduced in the previous step is washed away, ABCi st he only chemicalpassword that can trigger the color reaction.Reprinted with permission from Ref. [57] .Copyright2 014 John Wiley &Sons. ChemPhysChem 2017 ChemPhysChem , 18,1678 ChemPhysChem -1687 www.chemphyschem.org 2017 Wiley-VCH Verlag GmbH &Co. KGaA, Weinheim them, they also indicate severall imitations of this technology. The need to wash the system, following each step, slows down the authorization process and the attachment to solid support prevents these systems from operating at the molecular level. In addition, with such systems, password discrimination does not generally resultfrom operating am olecular computationd evice, but rather, from stepwise incubation protocols. This makes one wonder whethera ny oligonucleotide or peptidep repared by common solid phase synthesis can be considered an output of amolecular keypad lock.
Sequential logic is an integral parto fm any biological processes occurring in living cells, such as DNA replication and protein synthesis. Hence, another way to obtain molecular password systems is by harnessing the ability of cellst od iscriminate among input sequences. The sequence-dependent assembly of the nonhemolytic enterotoxin (Nhe) bacterial protein complex has inspired Märtlbauer [42] to construct ac ellular keypadl ock (Figure7)i nw hich mammalian cells are subjected to the sequential additiono ft he Nhe components: NheA (input A), NheB (input B), and NheC (input C).
The Nhe complex is toxic to mammalian cells and hence, in this password system, cytotoxicity was measured as an output using ac ell viability assay.B ecause NheC is the only input that can bind the cell's membrane on its own, and NheA can only bind to ap re-existing NheB/NheC complex,o nly the CBA sequenceb roughta bouth igh cytotoxicity,m aking it the correct password.
User AuthorizationbyP attern-Generating Fluorescent Molecular Probes
Molecular Keypad Locks
Al imitation of digitalm olecular keypadl ocks that produce an output of 0o r1i nr esponse to particular chemical or optical input sequences is the difficulty of using such systems to authorize multiple different passwords without replacingt he molecular device and/or chemical inputs. In addition, although such systems have been successfully used to distinguish among passwords with different input sequences (e.g.,1 23 and 321), they are less suitable for differentiating amongp asswords that contain distinct repeats of the same input (e.g.,1 22 and 112).
The Margulies group has recently demonstrated away to circumvent these problemsb ya pplying ad ifferent methodology for password authorization. [63] Rather than imitatingt he function of electronic logic circuits, they createdamolecular keypadl ock ( Figure 8, compound 8) t hat mimics the function of cross-reactive sensor arrays (the so-called chemical "noses/ tongues"). The latter are macroscopic analytical devices that, similart ot he way the olfactory system operates, can interact non-specifically with aw ider ange of analytes and discriminate amongt hem by creating aw ide range of unique identification patterns. [75] Hence, the main difference between 8 and the molecular keypadl ocks discussed before is that insteado f generating as ingle digital output (0 or 1) for each code entry, it associates each password with au nique emission "signature" that enables it to authorize multiple users.
The structure of ap attern-generating molecular keypad lock 8 (Figure 8a )c onsists of a cis-amino proline scaffold that is appendedw ith three carbohydrate binders (phenyl boronic acids) and four fluorescent reporters:f luorene (Flu), naphthalene (Naph), anthracene( An), and dansyl (Dan). Prior to its functiona samolecular keypad lock, [63] sensor 8 was used to discriminate among carbohydrate-based drugs. [76] The interaction of the latter with 8 distinctly affected the emissiono fe ach dye, which has led to the generation of uniqueo ptical fingerprints. The authors envisioned that pattern-generating sensors of this class could serve as efficient molecular keypadl ocks for three main reasons. [63] First, their ability to generate unique op- Figure 6 . AD NA-basedm olecular keypadlock (6) . Sequential addition of five partially overlapping DNA strands (i.e.,password abcde)toa nimmobilized strand s leads to the formation of aquadruplex/hemin DNAzyme that catalyzes the chromogenic oxidation of TMB.Reprinted with permission from Ref. [53] .Copyright 2013 RoyalC hemical Society. Figure 7 . Ac ell-based keypad lock (7) . Sequential addition of NheC(input C), NheB (input B), and NheA (input A) to mammaliancells leads to the formation of at oxic bacterial protein complex and consequently,tocell lysis (top). High cytotoxicity is produced specifically by the CBA input sequence (bottom). Adapted with permission from Ref. [42] .C opyright 2013 Royal Chemical Society. tical patterns by non-specifically interacting with different analytes increases substantially the number of chemical species that could serve as input keys. Second, because the fluorescence patterns generated by such systemsa re sensitive to changes in input concentrations, they should also be able to distinguish among passwords that contain ad ifferent number of inputr epeats( e.g.,1 22 vs. 112). Finally,t his class of molecular locks can exploit the tendency of multivalent host-guest complexes to be entrapped in different structural states. By producing ad istinct opticalf ingerprint for each metastable state, these pattern-generating molecular locks should be able to discriminate among aw ider range of password sequences (e.g.,1 23 and1 32). Indeed, subjecting 8 to different permutations of three diol-containing inputs:m altitol (1), d-xylose (2), and ad abcyl-catechol (3) (Figure8b) has led to the generation of distinct emission fingerprints (Figure 8c ). Analyzing the fluorescence responses by principal componentanalysis(PCA) (Figure 8d )c onfirmed that 8 can authorize eight unique passwords out of all 27 possible password combinations, and that it can also discriminate among longer passwords such as 1111, 2222, and 3333 ( Figure 8d ). Another pattern-generating molecular keypad lock (9)t hat can discriminate among chemical passwords in the absorption mode was recently reported by Rout ( Figure 9) . [64] The ability of even as imple, commerciallya vailable temoporfin dye (Figure 9a )t od iscriminate among the four possible passwords encoded by Cu 2 + (M1) and Fe 3 + (M0) (Figure 9b )f urther demonstratest he strengths and generality of this approach.
Cryptography, Steganography,and Password Protection by aM olecular-Scale Enigma Machine
Althought he moleculark eypad locks described up to this point demonstrate the possibility of authorizing users by chemicalm eans, which could,i np rinciple, be used to prevent accesst oc onfidential information, they also suffer from ag eneral limitation of password securitys ystems. That is, they are unable to protect the data if the password has been breached. For this reason,t hroughout history additional methods to secure information have emerged. The most ancient one is steganography,t he art of hiding information. Althought his simple method, which is mostlya ssociated with the use of secret inks, [77] does not provide av ery high security level, it is still used today to complement other defense mechanisms, even in modern computers. For example, files are often concealed within simple GIF or BMP images, [78] which keeps their existence hidden. The third and more powerful method to secure information is cryptography.W ith cryptography, au nique scheme is appliedt oc onvert data into another format (encrypted data), which can only be reversed by users that possess an appropriate decrypting scheme.
Recently,t he Margulies group has shown that by combining principles underlying the operation of molecular keypadl ocks with molecular cryptography,i tis possible to use this technology to protect communication. [65] The idea of using ap atterngenerating molecular sensor to secure communication was inspired by the functiono fp seudorandomn umber generators (PRNGs), which operate at the heart of various cryptographic machines.P RNGs can create strings of numbers( encryption keys) that are nearly random,w hich makes it almosti mpossible to decipher encrypted messages without having the correct decryption key.S imilar to PRNGs, pattern-generating molecular sensors such as 10 (Figures 8-10 ) can produce nearly unpredictable patterns. Hence, it was postulated that by converting each emission signature to as et of numbers, it would be possible to obtain aP RNG devicea tt he molecular scale.
The structure of 10 ( Figure 10 a) integrates three fluorescent reporters:n ile blue (NB, A), fluorescein( Flu, B), and sulforhodamine B( SRB, C), as well as aw ide range of distinct recognition elements that enable it to interacta nd respond to aw ide range of chemical species. The dipicolylamine (D)a nd boronic acid (E), for example, enable it to bind various metal ions and saccharides, respectively,w hereas the thiourea (F)a nd sulfonamide functionalities (G)s erve as anion-binding sites and hydrogen-bonding motifs. In addition, the structure and emissiono f Flu are pH dependent, whereas the solvatochromic NB respondsd ifferently to different solvents. These properties enabled m-SMS (10,F igure 10 a) to act as a" universal" sensort hat can discriminate among aw ide range of analytes, such as solvents, metal ions, saccharides, proteins, and commercial ingredients that can be obtained in grocery stores or pharmacies. This ability to produce aw ide range of distinct emission patterns was used to encrypt and decrypt messagesi naway that resembles the operation of the Enigma machine (Figure 10 b) . The latter is aw ell-known cipher machine that was used by the Germans to secure military communication duringW orld WarII.
As was done with the Enigma machine, in order to encrypt and decrypt messages,t he sender and receiver must use the same cipher machine (Figure 10 b) . In addition, they must also set up the correcti nitial state of the system (concentration, solvent, input concentration,a nd instrumental set-up), which resembles the need to configure the initial rotor settings of the Enigma machine. In this way,e ven if at hird party gets hold of the cipherm achine, the messages remain secure. The first step in encrypting the text (i.e.,o pen sesame) is transformingt he letters into numbersu sing ap ublic alphanumeric code (step I). Next, the sender introduces anyc hosen chemical b) Encryption and decryption of asecret message(i.e.,OPENS ESAME) using m-SMS (see the text for details). c) Linear discriminanta nalysis of the fluorescencep atterns generated by 10 in response to different sequences of ZnCl 2 (input 1), Na 2 PO 3 (input 2), andNaOH( input 3). d) Te xt obtained when the cipher text was decrypted using the correct password (331) or by using the wrong combination codes. Only in responset ot he right password (331) is the encrypted message("code approved") obtained. Reproduced with permissionfrom Ref. [65] .Copyright 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd:N ature Communications. ChemPhysChem 2017 ChemPhysChem , 18,1678 ChemPhysChem -1687 www.chemphyschem.org 2017 Wiley-VCH Verlag GmbH &Co. KGaA, Weinheim inputs into as olution with m-SMS, measures the fluorescence pattern (step II), and adds the numerical intensity values (encryptionk ey) to the originalm essage( step III). This affords ac iphert ext. The encrypted text can then be safely transmitted to arecipient, who repeatsthis procedure with an identical m-SMS device (step IV) to obtain ad ecryption key.B ys ubtracting the decryption key from the cipher text, the original message is revealed (step V).
To prevent the possibility that an enemy,w ho obtained the molecular cipher machine (m-SMS) and the correct chemical inputs, would recreate the encryption key by using a" brute force search", the principles of molecular keypad locks were applied. It was shown that by using ZnCl 2 (input 1), Na 2 PO 3 (input 2), and NaOH (input 3) as inputs, m-SMS can act as amolecular keypadl ock that can decrypt messages only if the inputs are introduced in ac orrect order (Figures 8c and 8d) . This additional layer of security (passwordp rotection) complicates attempts to decipher the message by subjecting 10 to different concentrationsa nd combinationso fi nputs until am eaningful text results from this screen.
Several potential advantages of using am olecular cipher machine, overamacroscopic one, were demonstrated. For example,i th as been shown that with m-SMS, the messages can be encrypted from various locations using ah and-held spectrofluorometer,a nd that m-SMS and/or its chemical inputs can be hidden on ap iece of printed paper (steganography) and be sent to the recipient by regular mail. Finally,i tw as shown that ad ifferent molecular cipherm achine can be easily created simply by replacing af ew of the recognition and signaling elements.T aken together this work demonstrated the feasibility of combining three different methods for securing information, cryptography,s teganography,a nd password protection,u sing as ingle molecular platform.
Conclusions
In summary,b yd escribing the different approaches that have been used to obtain molecular keypadl ocks (molecular logic gates vs. pattern-generating probes), the plethora of molecular and biomolecular components that can be used to construct and operate them (e.g.,s mall fluorescent probes, photochromic switches,D NA structures, enzymes, and cells), as well as the additional layers of security (cryptography and steganography) that can complement the use of molecular password systems, we hope to attractt he attentiono fr eaders from different disciplines to this relativelyu ndeveloped field. Bringing new expertise and research directions into this area may prompt the development of novel molecular security systems that utilize new types of materials and building blocks, new input-output transduction mechanisms, and novel operating environments to afford stronger,m ore secure passwordsa nd encryption schemes. Such developments may also lead to the creationo fm olecular authorizationd evices that better compete with current electronic security systemsi nt erms of input/ output multiplicity,l ow maintenance, and the ability to reprogram and reset these devices.I tc an also be expected that applicationsf or these technologiesw ould not necessarily be found in information security.I nstead, such developments could lead to the creation of novel computations ystems, sensors, and drugs.
